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I. Introduction
In light of recent national dialogue concerning the National Security
Administration’s (NSA) use of spying, data collection, privacy, and civil
liberties, it may come as no surprise that our vehicles are also tracking our
movements and recording information that could be used against us in
court. Regardless of whether this can (and perhaps should) be expected in
the 21st century, it raises a disconcerting potential for infringement on
privacy rights. Consumers and privacy advocates should be troubled by
companies and the government having too much access to private
information in the absence of clear guidelines about when and how this data
can and will be used.
Most Americans are familiar with the “black box” in aircraft, which
records data and sound continuously throughout a flight and can later be
retrieved and played back in the event of an accident.1 What most American
car owners do not know is that approximately 96 percent of all new
vehicles sold in the United States are also equipped with black boxes that
record accident information.2 Unlike black boxes in aircraft, drivers can rest
1. See Laurel Dalrymple, What Would It Take To Destroy A Black Box? NPR (Mar.
11, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/11/289189214/what-would-ittake-to-destroy-a-black-box (explaining that aircraft have two black boxes; one which stores
information on flight control and engine performance and another voice recorder, and that it
is extremely rare for them to be destroyed).
2. See Martin Kaste, Yes, Your New Car Has A ‘Black Box.’ Where’s The Off
Switch? ALL TECH CONSIDERED: NPR (Mar. 20, 2013 4:46 PM), http://www.npr.org/
blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/03/20/174827589/yes-your-new-car-has-a-black-box-wheresthe-off-switch (quoting Rep. Michael Capuano, D-Mass, stating “I don’t think you’ll find
very many Americans who know these devices are in their cars”); see also Jaclyn Trop,
Black Boxes, in Most New Cars, Stir Privacy Concerns, N. Y. TIMES, (July 22, 2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/07/21/black-boxes-cars-raise-privacyconcerns/VGaCyAgtTERx0D4njkPsFL/story.html (stating that approximately 96 percent of
new vehicles sold in the United States have black boxes and that drivers who do not read the
owner’s manual thoroughly may not know their vehicle can capture and record their speed,
brake position, seat belt use, and other data). See also Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., U.S. DOT Proposes Broader Use of Event Data Recorders to Help Improve
Vehicle Safety (Dec. 7, 2012) http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+
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assured that the devices in their vehicles do not currently record audio or
video,3 although there is no guarantee that this will continue to be the case
in the future. At minimum, automobile black boxes record brief events in
the seconds before, during, and after a crash.4 However, they also have the
capacity to reveal information about drivers’ habits, including where they
go, how fast they travel, and even whether the driver and passengers have
buckled up.5 This information relates directly to finding fault in accident
investigations.6
If a driver crashes his car into a tree and informs the police he was
wearing a seat belt and driving within the speed limit, the police will help
clear the scene and the driver will have to deal with his insurance company
regarding the damages. If that vehicle is equipped with a black box,
however, the speed of the car upon impact, the driver’s acceleration or
deceleration in the seconds before and just after impact, whether the air bag
deployed on-time, and many other pieces of information relevant to an
accident investigation may be recorded. The police can use this information
to find fault and issue tickets.7 Former lieutenant governor of
Massachusetts, Timothy P. Murray, paid a $555 fine for driving more than
100 miles an hour and failing to wear a seat belt: the proof came from the
silent witness in his own car.8
DOT+Proposes+Broader+Use+of+Event+Data+Recorders+to+Help+Improve+Vehicle+Saf
ety [hereinafter NHTSA U.S. DOT Press Release] (stating that NHTSA estimates
approximately 96 percent of model year 2013 passenger cars and light-duty vehicles are
already equipped with EDR capability).
3. See NHTSA U.S. DOT Press Release, supra note 2 (“EDRs do not collect any
personal identifying information or record conversations and do not run continuously.”).
4. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Welcome to the NHTSA Event Data
Recorder Research Web Site, http://www.nhtsa.gov/EDR (last visited Dec. 7, 2014)
[hereinafter NHTSA Event Data Recorder] (discussing what EDRs record for NHTSA’s
purposes).
5. See id.; see also Phillip Swarts, Is Your Car Spying on You? GPS Tracks
‘Consumers,’ Identity Theft at Risk, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.washington times.com/news/2014/jan/7/no-privacy-behind-the-wheel-your-carmight-be-spyi/?page=all (quoting an Electronic Privacy Information Center attorney, Alan
Butler, who stated that “[EDR] data, if it was breached, could reveal a great deal of
information about individual drivers . . . where they live, work and worship, among other
things”).
6. See Mary-Rose Abraham, Is That a ‘Black Box’ in Your Car? ABCNEWS (Feb.
22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/MellodyHobson/car-black-box-records-keydata/story?id=9814181 (noting the use of black box data is useful to law enforcement,
insurance companies and accident reconstruction companies).
7. See id.
8. See Trop, supra note 2 (explaining that Murray had originally told the police he
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The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
recently proposed mandating black boxes in all new vehicles manufactured
on or after September 2014.9 NHTSA collects black box data after
accidents and uses that information to develop more effective vehicle
standards.10 According to a NHTSA administrator, a broader black box
requirement would “provide critical safety information that might not
otherwise be available to NHTSA to evaluate what happened during a
crash—and what future steps could be taken to save lives and prevent
injuries.”11
While automakers generally support NHTSA’s efforts to make
recording devices mandatory, consumer groups and privacy advocates are
perpetually troubled by the prospect of the government gaining too much
access to private information without limitation.12 Auto manufacturers
generally do not disclose to buyers information collected by black boxes, its
uses or protections.13 The result: most drivers are unaware that a silent
witness in their car could, in the event of an accident, provide evidence in
court to criminalize them.14
Americans have accepted the use of black boxes in aircraft but there
remains a fundamental difference between boarding a commercial airline
for a flight and stepping into one’s own car to run some errands. Airplanes
follow flight plans, are tracked by air traffic control, and flight manifests
account for each person on board. Passengers choosing to fly commercial
flights relinquish many privacy rights for the sake of safety, but are these

was wearing a seat belt and not speeding but according to the device in his car, he was
driving more than 100 miles an hour and not wearing a seat belt).
9. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,144 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (proposing a new
safety standard mandating the installation of EDRs in most light vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2014); see also Request for Comment on Automotive Electronic
Control Systems Safety and Security Notice, 79 Fed. Reg. 60574 n. 26 (noting that no final
rule publication date has been established).
10. See NHTSA Event Data Recorder, supra note 4 (describing NHTSA’s uses for
black box information).
11. See NHTSA U.S. DOT Press Release, supra note 2 (quoting NHTSA
Administrator David Strickland).
12. See Swarts, supra note 5 (quoting a Government Accountability Office
representative discussing the concerns of privacy advocacy groups).
13. See id.
14. See Abraham, supra note 6 (noting that while automakers typically disclose the
presence of an EDR in owner’s manuals, some drivers still may not know they have an EDR
in their vehicle).
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same travelers equally willing to relinquish privacy rights in their own
personal vehicles?
Complications ensue as data acquisition capabilities advance and
converge with GPS data to remotely track drivers’ locations.15 Privacy
concerns regarding the regulation of the information collected include:
access, ownership, usage, accuracy, reliability, and post-accident security of
the data. Without proper regulations, the conveyance of a driver’s vehicle
information can be sent to third parties without consent or used to commit
identity theft, stalking, or surreptitious monitoring without their
knowledge.16 While citizens undoubtedly desire better-performing, safer
vehicles, the quantity of data currently collected has the potential for abuse.
The law needs to anticipate these technological issues before the data
collection infringes on Americans’ constitutional rights.
This Note examines the current legal framework governing the use of
black boxes in automobiles. Part II distinguishes black boxes from other
data capturing devices in automobiles and explains the capabilities of both,
including storage of and access to the data—specifically who may access it
and through what means. Part III sets forth the current federal and state
provisions governing black boxes and discusses the legal consumer
concerns regarding notice, ownership, consent, and privacy and how the
federal guidelines fall short of necessary privacy safeguards. Part III also
explores the potential Fourth Amendment implications of data collection
from vehicles and its use by third parties as well as the use of black box
data as evidence in civil and criminal trials. Part IV addresses pending
federal legislation that will solve some, but not all, of the issues created by
the recording and collection of vehicle data and anticipates what Americans
might expect from the future as the prevalence of recording devices
increases.
II. What is the Black Box?
Inconsistency plagues black box terminology; in the industry, it may
be referred to as an event data recorder (EDR) or a sensing diagnostic
module (SDM).17 NHTSA uses the term, “event data recorder” and has
15. See Swarts, supra note 5 (noting that consumers’ locations and other data are at
risk of being leaked by companies running GPS and other automobile navigation systems).
16. See id.
17. See Gregg Laskoski, NHTSA’s Requirement: ‘Black Box’ Recorders in All U.S.
Vehicles, GASBUDDY (Sept. 13, 2014, 6:00 AM) https://blog.gasbuddy.com/posts/NHTSA-s-
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defined it as “a device installed in a motor vehicle to record technical
vehicle and occupant information for a brief period of time (seconds, not
minutes) before, during and after a crash.”18 This Note will refer to “black
boxes” or “EDRs” interchangeably, with the understanding that not all
vehicles necessarily contain one physical box or device.
Black boxes in vehicles are not necessarily black or boxes. Rather,
they comprise a network of separate components and the term “black box”
refers to the function of recording certain data within a vehicle’s system
most often triggered by crash events.19 In many advanced systems, dozens
of interconnected electronic control units (ECUs) or electronic control
modules (ECMs) can be found embedded in the body, doors, dash, roof,
trunk, seats, wheels and many other parts of modern vehicles.20 These
individual components assist in vehicle management: sensing engine fuel
levels, air bag system deployment, antilock brake system activation, roll
stability, cruise control management, climate control management,
pollution control, speed-controlled stereo volume, activating warning lights
when necessary, and even sensing whether to pull seat belts tighter.21
General Motors pioneered EDR use in the mid-1970s in vehicles that
were equipped with air bags, in order to better understand air bag responses
during a crash.22 By 1998, air bags were mandated in all new vehicles and
Requirement-Black-Box-Recorders-in-All-U-S-Vehicles/1715-583664-2635.aspx
(noting
the many names of Event Data Recorders, including “black boxes” and “sensing diagnostic
modules”).
18. See NHTSA Event Data Recorder supra note 4.
19. See John C. Glennon, Event Data Recorders Explained, CRASH FORENSICS.COM,
http://www.crashforensics.com/automobiledatarecorders.cfm (last visited Jan. 2, 2014)
(noting that “Black Box” is actually a descriptor of the recording function).
20. Id.
21. See id. (explaining how ECMs interact and the information they process); see also
Nancy M. Erfle, Learning to Live with Electronic Data Recorders, 38 THE BRIEF 14 (2008)
(describing the capabilities of some automobile models); see also Cheryl Balough & Richard
Balough, Cyberterrorism on Wheels: Are Today’s Cars Vulnerable to Attack?, 2013 A.B.A.
BUS. L. TODAY 1 (2013) (describing the multiple points of entry into a car’s computer
system); see also Kaste, supra note 2 (noting how the car’s safety system makes split-second
decisions about various functions).
22. See Jim Travers, Black Box 101: The Basics of Event Data Recorders, CONSUMER
REPORTS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010, 1:50 PM), http://www.consumerreports.org/
cro/news/2010/03/black-box-101-the-basics-of-event-data-recorders/index.htm (explaining that
General Motors used a basic EDR on airbag-equipped models in the mid-1970s and
downloaded the EDR data after the crash); Black box 101: Understanding event data recorders
(Jan. 2014) http://consumerreports.org/cro/2012/10/black-box-101-understanding-event-datarecorders/index.htm; 84 AM. JUR. 3D 1 Proof of Facts § 10 (2005) (explaining that the impetus
for the first EDR in automobiles was the development of the airbag).
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as they became the norm, computer systems necessarily evolved to measure
the acceleration forces involved in a crash and to electrically deploy the air
bags.23 Not surprisingly, vehicles became gradually more dependent on
computers to run internal systems and manufacturers increasingly installed
EDRs in their vehicles to perform a variety of operational and safety
functions, including safety research.24
EDR systems have greatly advanced over the years and now have the
capability to record many functions such as deceleration before and during
a crash, engine throttle (how far the accelerator pedal was pressed), whether
or not the brakes were applied, whether or not the driver was using a seat
belt, frontal air bag deployment, and other data relevant to the moments
immediately before, during, and after a crash.25 Modern EDR systems are
not limited to physical download and can transmit data over remote
wireless networks, providing immediate safety information so that
emergency personnel can respond directly to the scene of an accident.26
A. Use of EDR Data
NHTSA has been using information gathered from EDRs to support its
crash investigation program for several years by collecting and analyzing
EDR data from automobile accidents to determine causes and whether
vehicles were operating properly just prior to an accident.27 When NHTSA
conducts crash investigations, the agency obtains permission from the
23. See Mark Joye, Column: Big Brother or Big Savior? Here Comes the Black Box,
16 S. CAROLINA LAWYER 38, 40 (Sept. 2004); see also Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
Admissibility of Evidence Taken from Vehicular Event Data Recorders (EDR), Sensing
Diagnostic Modules (SDM) or “Black Boxes”, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 595 (2013) (noting that every
vehicle with an airbag has a control monitor which determines whether to deploy the airbags
in a developing crash).
24. See Joye, supra note 23 (explaining the history of EDR devices).
25. See Jason Torchinsky, Everything You Need To Know About The Black Boxes
Coming To Your Next Car, JALOPNIK.COM (Dec. 7, 2012, 2:45 PM),
http://jalopnik.com/5966628/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-black-boxes-coming-toyour-next-car (providing many examples of the capabilities of event data recorders).
26. See Event Data Recorders, 71 Fed. Reg. 50,998, 51,032 (Aug. 28, 2006) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 563) (detailing how the data can expedite the dispatch of emergency
services to the location of a crash, thus reducing morbidity and mortality of traffic crash
victims); see also Balough & Balough, supra note 21 (adding that vehicle manufacturers are
beginning to add Wi-Fi hot spots in vehicles).
27. See NHTSA Event Data Recorder, supra note 4 (stating that EDRs can provide
valuable information to understanding crashes which can improve motor vehicle safety).
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vehicle owner prior to downloading the EDR data.28 According to NHTSA,
personal identifying information about drivers is not collected.29 NHTSA’s
findings are shared with manufacturers for designing safer vehicles, in line
with NHTSA’s mission to “[s]ave lives, prevent injuries and reduce
economic costs due to road traffic crashes, through education, research,
safety standards and enforcement activity.”30
Only recently have EDRs come to the forefront of conversation due to
NHTSA’s proposed legislation mandating black boxes in every new vehicle
by September 2014.31 Industry experts believe that more vehicles equipped
with EDRs will better help engineers and researchers understand how cars
perform in the real world, outside test centers, and thus contribute to vehicle
and passenger safety.32 This information is allegedly only collected in the
event of an accident but a deeper look into some manufacturer’s privacy
policies suggests that this may not be the case and that information sharing
with third parties occurs for reasons other than promotion of safety
research.33
Without on-board data recording, skid marks and any potential witness
testimony comprise pre-crash information while post-crash information is
centered on damage to the vehicles and the occupants’ physical injuries.
Vehicles equipped with EDR capabilities, however, can provide pre-crash
information which includes, but is not limited to, seatbelt use, steering,
speed, braking, ABS activation and environmental conditions.34 During the
28. See EDR Q&AS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (Aug. 11, 2006),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/Rulemaking/Rules/Associated%20Files/EDR_QAs_11
Aug2006.pdf (recommending vehicle owners do not tamper or disable any vehicle safety
system).
29. Id.
30. NHTSA’s Core Values, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/NH TSA's+Core+Values [hereinafter NHTSA’s Core
Values]. See also 77 Fed. Reg. 74,144 (Dec. 13, 2012) (giving an overview of EDR
technology).
31. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,144 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (proposing a new
safety standard mandating the installation of EDRs in most light vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2014).
32. See Trop, supra note 2 (quoting Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
representative discussing the importance of EDRs in research and engineering).
33. See infra Part III.C.3 for a discussion of the likely possibility that more
information is collected and used for a variety of purposes than what is expressed to
consumers.
34. See AUGUSTUS CHIDESTER ET AL., RECORDING AUTOMOTIVE CRASH EVENT DATA,
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crash, EDRs will record air bag activation time, change in speed, and
location data.35
States are also beginning to test usage of EDR data for taxation: taxing
drivers based on miles driven.36 Federal and state-mandated gasoline taxes
have existed for decades and are typically allocated for maintenance of road
infrastructure.37 As the fuel economy of modern vehicles improves38 and, in
some cases, when the car doesn’t use any gasoline at all, the fair share that
a new vehicle contributes toward the road infrastructure is reduced in
comparison to an older vehicle with much higher fuel consumption. To
circumvent this, a mileage fee is charged based on the number of miles
driven and can be tracked using telematics.39 The same systems insurance
companies use to track drivers can be used to report mileage for taxation.40

NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD. (May 5, 1999), http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/problems/studies/
record/chidester.htm (providing tables that show data which can be collected from vehicles
equipped with enhanced on-board recording capability).
35. Id.
36. See Evan Halper, A Black Box in Your Car? Some See a Source of Tax Revenue,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-roads-black-boxes20131027,0,6090226.story#axzz2ixCo2VOR (explaining that since Americans are buying
less gas because cars now get more miles to the gallon, politicians are looking to other ways
to tax driving instead of continuing to raise gas prices). The concept for tracking and taxing
commercial trucks, at least, has already been in use in Germany and New Zealand for many
years. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-77, HIGHWAY TRUST FUND: PILOT
PROGRAM COULD HELP DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF MILEAGE FEES FOR CERTAIN VEHICLES,
at 19 (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-77 (explaining that
the commercial truck user fee systems in Germany and New Zealand show considerable
revenues and other benefits can be achieved but that enforcing compliance in a cost-effective
manner presents trade-offs).
37. See Kelly Phillips Erb, Federal Gas Tax Passes Another Milestone: What Is The
Future?, FORBES (June 6, 2013, 8:48 AM) (explaining the impetus in the 1950s of the
highway trust fund to pay for roads and maintenance).
38. See Bill Vlasic & Jaclyn Trop, Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Reaches a High, Nearing
Goal for 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013) (pointing out the advancements in fuel-efficient
vehicles and noting that consumers are interested in purchasing fuel-efficient vehicles).
39. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-77 supra note 36 (introducing
a mileage-fee system called “True Mileage” and noting that people would be more open to
the concept if the device did not track speed or location).
40. See John Pearley Huffman, The Taxman Driveth: In the Future, Your Car May Rat
You Out to the Tax Collector, CAR AND DRIVER, Feb. 2014, at 22 (explaining how
Progressive Insurance’s “Snapshot” works by recording how the vehicle is operated,
including miles driven during a 30-day period, and that this can be used to report mileage for
taxation).
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B. Other Data Capturing Devices
Black boxes are not the only means of collecting information about
drivers. For the last two decades, vehicle manufacturers have been
installing luxury systems and enhanced safety features in vehicles which
coincidentally provide opportunities for remote-access to vehicle data and
consumer information. Newer vehicles often have GPS device capability
built in, providing customers with hands-free access to emergency services,
vehicle diagnostics, navigation applications, turn-by-turn directions, and
traffic information.41 Some services even offer remote ignition block and
remote deceleration in the event of vehicle theft.42 When drivers use mobile
phones to access GPS technology or use their in-car GPS systems, this
information is often collected and shared with third-party marketers and the
companies providing the luxury features.43
Insurance companies provide incentives for customers to use devices
that track their driving habits—promising better drivers better rates.44
Progressive Auto Insurance, for example, uses a device it calls “Snapshot”
which tracks driver behavior and sends the data over a cellular signal to the
insurer.45 The Snapshot device even beeps when drivers make an unwise
maneuver.46

41. See id. (explaining the rush for vehicle manufacturers to add new Wi-Fi functions
as selling points); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-81, IN-CAR LOCATIONBASED SERVICES: COMPANIES ARE TAKING STEPS TO PROTECT PRIVACY, BUT SOME RISKS
MAY NOT BE CLEAR TO CONSUMERS, at 11 (2013), [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659509.pdf (discussing companies which collect location
data from vehicles to provide turn-by-turn directions, traffic information, and other services
to customers as well as third-party companies).
42. Balough & Balough, supra note 21.
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 2 (finding that a company review of the privacy of
location data collected by mobile devices did not consistently follow industry-recommended
privacy practices).
44. See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat
of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 1153, 1154 (Summer 2011) (describing how
insurance companies use devices that record geographic location, minute-by-minute
speeding violations, and seat belt usage); see also John Markoff, Researchers Show How a
Car’s Electronics Can Be Taken Over Remotely, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/business/10hack.html?_r=0 (providing examples such
as General Motors’ OnStar, Toyota’s SafetyConnect, Ford’s Sync, BMW’s Assist, and
Mercedes Benz’s Mbrace).
45. See Progressive Auto Insurance, available at http://www.progressive.
com/auto/snapshot/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013).
46. Id.
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Transponders, like EZ-PASS, have been known to be used for data
collection research and may allow law enforcement to gather information
transmitted about vehicle locations.47 All of these built-in “smart”
technology features produce a trove of information that can easily be sold to
third party marketers, companies, and agencies.
C. Access and Storage
Black boxes must capture and record data elements for events in
accordance with federal regulations.48 The data elements are stored within
the vehicle and can only be accessed with vehicle-specific equipment.49
Each car manufacturer has its own mechanisms for collecting, storing,
extracting, and using data from in-vehicle recording devices.50 After all,
manufacturers initially installed black boxes for safety reasons and the data
was not initially intended for use either by consumers or third parties.51
While it is likely more convenient for each manufacturer to have their own
black box design and methods of access, the lack of standardization
complicates accident investigations.52 The data available depends on the
year, make, and model of the vehicle and extraction of such data normally
requires a technician with physical access to the vehicle.53
47. See Detroit News Washington Bureau, Carmakers keep data on drivers’ locations,
2014 WLNR 462895 (Jan. 7, 2014) (explaining that EZ-PASS can be used by law
enforcement as well as for research).
48. See Event Data Recorders, 49 C.F.R. § 563.9 (2014) (setting forth the
requirements for data capture).
49. See Travers, supra note 22 (explaining that special tools are required to access
captured EDR data); see also Abraham, supra note 6 (pointing out that retrieval of data
requires special software to collect speed, engine rpm, brake and throttle data, and more).
50. See GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 25 (reporting that there is no consensus
among major automakers, each of whom has differing policies about how much data they
collect and how long they keep it); see also Susan Kuchinskas, Making the Most of the App
Opportunity, Part II, TELEMATICS UPDATE (June 17, 2013), http://analysis.telematics
update.com/infotainment/making-most-app-opportunity-part-ii. (stating that according to the
head of consumer applications for ALK Technologies, an American company and global
leader in GeoLogistics and navigation software, “[a]uto vendors like to keep control over the
customer and the customer experience”).
51. See Kaste, supra note 2 (quoting accident reconstruction specialist Dave Wells
saying “[blackbox] was never designed for investigative purposes . . . [i]t was designed
for . . . motor vehicle safety and keeping people less injured and alive”).
52. See id.
53. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Column: Retrieving Black Box Evidence from Vehicles:
Uses and Abuses of Vehicle Data Recorder Evidence in Criminal Trials, 33 CHAMPION 12,
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Some domestic and import manufacturers allow third party suppliers
to make tools available to investigators to access the data but others make
the data harder to obtain.54 Toyota, for example, has garnered criticism for
restricting access to their vehicles’ black box data; the company has only
one laptop in the United States capable of downloading data from its black
boxes.55 In a case discussed later in this Note, local police authorities were
initially unable to download data from a security vehicle involved in a
motor accident and, in order to complete the investigation, had to wait
several days for a private crash reconstructionist who had the appropriate
tools for downloading the module’s data.56
Manufacturers ensure that EDR data can be retained, even when
disconnected from a power source or after a significant crash, or fire,
rendering the ignition non-operational.57 If air bags have deployed, the EDR
data is frozen and can be removed from the vehicle so that the data can be
downloaded.58 Many EDRs also record potential crash situations where the
air bags do not deploy.59 Storage of potential or pre-crash data occurs in
13–14 (May 2009) (describing what information is recorded by automobile black boxes and
that access can be obtained through a port in the vehicle).
54. See Travers, supra note 22. General Motors and Ford Motor Co., for instance,
allow outsiders to access EDR data by purchasing a $25,000 reader. See id. Toyota has been
criticized for how difficult it is to access their black box data; the company releases crash
data only under a court order or at the request of NHTSA. Id. Furthering that, Toyota said
the company only had one laptop in the United States that was capable of downloading data
from its black boxes but that Toyota “pledged to make more available to officials soon.” Id.
It seems ironic that Toyota has been singled out after the well-known 2009–2011 Toyota
vehicle recalls due to brake problems. See Hiroko Tabuchi, 1.5 Million Toyotas Recalled for
Brake and Fuel Pump Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/10/22/business/global/22toyota.html?_r=0 (reporting on the Toyota Motor
Company announcement of a global recall of 1.53 million vehicles due to brake and fuel
pump problems).
55. See Travers, supra note 22 (furthering that the company releases crash data only
under a court order or at the request of NHTSA but that Toyota “pledged to make more
available to officials soon.”); see also Tabuchi, supra note 54.
56. See Kirsch v. State, 276 S.W.3d 579, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting the
relevant findings from the trial court); see also infra Part III.C.3.
57. See Joye, supra note 23 (noting that non-volatile electrically erasable
programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) technology was first used in electric
odometers that saved the vehicle’s cumulative mileage even when the battery was
disconnected).
58. Id. (explaining how EDR data is retrieved from a vehicle).
59. See Glancy supra note 53, at 14 (noting that “[a]lmost no one, outside the vehicle
manufacturer and regulation communities, is aware that pre-crash data is recorded”)
(emphasis added).
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situations such as making sudden stops or bounces, rapid speed changes, or
sharp turns to avoid obstacles in the road.60 Thus, many erratic movements
that may very well be necessary to avoid collisions are recorded. Storage of
pre-crash data is limited to a set time period (perhaps one or two months or
a number of ignition cycles) but could potentially be available as evidence
in court before being automatically overwritten.61
III. Current Legal Framework
Vehicle black boxes are primarily regulated and studied by NHTSA,
which has neither imposed caps on the amount of data that can be collected
nor directly addressed consumer privacy concerns.
Fourteen states have crafted various standards of ownership and rights
but no federal law exists to clarify the rights of a vehicle owner with respect
to this recorded data.62 Ultimately, if drivers are even aware of the
possibility that their actions could be recorded, they are denied a clear
understanding, based on any federal law, of exactly what is stored and for
how long that information could potentially be used against them.
A. Federal Regulations
In 2006, NHTSA finalized a rule specifying uniform, national
requirements for vehicles equipped with EDRs “concerning the collection,
storage, and retrievability of onboard motor vehicle crash event data” for
vehicles manufactured after September 1, 2012.63 This regulation, codified
in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, §§ 563.1 through 563.12, does
not require EDRs in vehicles; it only applies to vehicles that the
manufacturer has already equipped with this technology.64 The purpose is to
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,144 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (acknowledging that
consumer privacy concerns persist regarding EDR data but that the NHTSA, as an agency,
does not have the statutory authority to address many privacy issues because they are
generally matters of State and Federal law). Approximately 12 states have enacted laws
addressing these issues. Id.
63. 49 C.F.R. §§ 563.1–563.12 (2014). This requirement applies to light vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1, 2012 that are equipped with EDRs. Id.
64. Id.
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help ensure “that EDRs record, in a readily usable manner, data valuable for
effective crash investigations and for analysis of safety equipment
performance . . . These data will help provide a better understanding of the
circumstances in which crashes and injuries occur and will lead to safer
vehicle designs.”65
The current regulations set forth exactly which data elements EDRs, if
they are installed, must capture and record in certain circumstances; these
include: changes in speed leading up to and during a crash, percentage of
engine throttle, how far the accelerator pedal was pressed, whether or not
the brake was applied, the number of power cycles applied to the EDR at
the time of crash and number of power cycles applied to the EDR when the
data was downloaded, whether or not the driver was using a safety belt,
whether or not the frontal air bag warning lamp was on, driver frontal air
bag deployment, right front passenger frontal air bag deployment, number
of crash events, time between first two crash events if applicable, whether
or not the EDR completed recording.66
The rule addresses the issue of access by requiring “vehicle
manufacturers to make data retrieval tools and/or methods commercially
available so that crash investigators and researchers are able to retrieve data
from EDRs.”67 This means data must be both physically survivable and
retrievable after a crash, even in the event of major damage or a fire, and
the data must be readily usable—otherwise the devices are rendered
useless.68 The data must also be recorded in a format specified and with a
certain degree of accuracy.69 Without this caveat, manufacturing companies
might be the sole entities capable of retrieving and reading the data in their
65. Id. at § 563.2.
66. See id. at § 563.7 (listing the required data elements for vehicles equipped with an
EDR); Event Data Recorders, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY (Mar. 2014),
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/event-data-recorders/qanda#cite-text-0-1 (citing Final Rule
on Event Data Recorders, 71 Fed. Reg. 50,998–51,048 (Aug. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R pt. 563) (listing what EDRs must record for layman understanding rather than reading
the C.F.R which uses more technical language).
67. See 49 C.F.R. § 563.1 (providing the scope of part 563).
68. See infra Part IV.A.1 for a discussion of NHTSA’s proposed regulations; Crash
Test Performance and Survivability, 49 C.F.R. § 563.10 (2014); Event Data Recorders, 77
Fed. Reg. 74,144 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (explaining
the purpose for standard requirements for EDRs).
69. See 49 C.F.R. § 563.8 (2014), for a table of data elements that must be reported in
accordance with a specific degree of accuracy; See 49 C.F.R. § 563.10 (outlining crash test
performance and survivability); 49 C.F.R. § 563.9 (specifying that air bag deployment-event
data must not be overwritten by current event data).
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vehicles. That could be troublesome because it would add additional
burdens for all parties if the data were subpoenaed to be used in court.
Clearly, the primary purpose of the current federal regulations is to
emulate NHTSA’s goals of targeting driver safety, understanding accident
causation, and developing safer vehicle designs70 with little regard to
consumer protection and personal data privacy concerns. Neither the Code
of Federal Regulations, nor NHTSA specifically, explains the type of data it
collects and uses. In fact, NHTSA has even acknowledged that “consumer
privacy concerns persist regarding EDR data: Who owns it, who has access
to it and under what circumstances, and what purposes for which it may be
used.”71
B. Consumer Concerns
1. Notice
The current federal regulations do not sufficiently address the issue of
notice for consumers. Code of Federal Regulations Section 563.11 does set
forth a specific statement that must be in the owner’s manual, alerting the
owner to the presence of an EDR and its function.72 This blanket statement,
however, will be buried somewhere in the text with no consumer disclosure
requirement prior to purchase.73 A buyer is unlikely to read through the
70. See 49 C.F.R. § 563.2 (noting the purpose of 49 C.F.R. 563); see also NHTSA’s
Core Values, supra note 30 (providing NHTSA’s core values and purpose).
71. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,144, 74,146 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (emphasis
added).
72. See 49 C.F.R. § 563.11(a) (2014). The owner’s manual in each vehicle must state
that the vehicle is equipped with an EDR and that its main purpose is to record, in certain
crash or near crash situations, information such as an air bag deployment or hitting a road
obstacle, how various systems in the vehicle were operating, whether or not safety belts were
buckled, how far the driver was depressing the accelerator and/or brake pedal, and how fast
the vehicle was traveling. Id.
73. For an example of notice of the presence of an event data recorder in a modern car,
see 2012 HONDA CIVIC SEDAN ONLINE REFERENCE OWNER’S MANUAL, AMERICAN HONDA
MOTOR CO. 1 (2011), available at http://techinfo.honda.com/rjanisis/pubs/OM/R01212/
R01212OM.pdf. In this online manual, which is presumably identical to the print version,
neither the “Quick Reference Guide” nor the extensive Index mention “event data recorder,”
“EDR,” or anything about recording devices in the vehicle. One would have to “control F”
to find the notice of “Event Data Recorders” which states that the vehicle is equipped with
an EDR and explains the “main purpose of an EDR is to record, in certain crash or near
crash-like situations, such as an air bag deployment or hitting a road obstacle, data that will
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manual prior to purchasing a vehicle, if ever. Thus, many vehicle owners
are oblivious as to the presence of an EDR in their vehicle and many more
are not aware that this data can be used against them in civil or criminal
proceedings, or by their insurance company to increase their rates.74
Additionally, drivers purchasing luxury vehicles may not understand that
in-car GPS technology also has the potential to collect both personal and
current location data.
2. Ownership and Consent
The presence of EDR systems is generally nonconsensual; they are
present in most new vehicles unbeknownst to the purchaser, who cannot
refuse to be monitored.75 “[Y]ou can’t shut it off, and you can’t manipulate
it,” said a General Motors safety engineering spokesman.76 In fact, because
EDRs are an integral part of a vehicle’s operating system, if a vehicle
owner tampers with or disables an EDR, it may render inoperative
important vehicle safety devices such as the air bag system.77
Even if vehicle owners have consented to the presence of recording
devices in their cars, ownership remains a common concern of consumer
assist in understanding how a vehicle’s systems performed. Id at 21. The EDR is designed to
record data related to vehicle dynamics and safety systems for a short period of time,
typically 30 seconds or less. Id. The EDR in this vehicle is designed to record such data as:
“How various systems in your vehicle were operating; whether or not the driver and
passenger safety belts were buckled/fastened; how far (if at all) the driver was depressing the
accelerator and/or brake pedal; and, how fast the vehicle was traveling . . .” Id The section
also sets forth how the data is used and includes a notice that, while no data is recorded
under “normal driving conditions” and no personal data are recorded, other parties, such as
law enforcement, could combine the EDR data with the type of personally identifying data
routinely acquired during a crash investigation. Id.
74. See Mike Capuano, Congressman Capuano’s E-Update, Privacy and Your
Vehicle, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS. (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.
house.gov/capuano/e-updates/eu2013-06-24.shtml (writing to his constituents about his
recent filing of the “Black Box Privacy Protection Act”).
75. See Bob Gritzinger, Big Brother is Riding Shotgun, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Nov. 15,
2004, 12:01 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20041115/SUB/411150735#axzz2m
GobpoFp (noting that the system cannot be manipulated or shut off and thus purchasers of a
new vehicle containing an EDR cannot refuse to have the EDR used in that vehicle).
76. See id. (quoting GM safety engineering spokesman, Jim Schell).
77. See EDR Q&As, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (Aug. 11, 2006),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/Rulemaking/Rules/Associated%20Files/EDR_QAs_11
Aug2006.pdf (recommending vehicle owners do not tamper or disable any vehicle safety
system).

172

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 156 (2014)

and privacy advocates—who owns EDRs and the data obtained from
them?78 NHTSA considers the owner of the vehicle to be the owner of its
EDR data but this, ultimately, is a matter of state law.79
Generally, the fourteen states that have EDR laws have also concluded
that the vehicle, as well as the data, have a common owner and the EDR
data may not be downloaded by anyone other than the registered owner,
except with the owner’s consent or if ordered by a court.80 Even in those
fourteen states, regardless of who owns the EDR data, it has generally been
allowed as evidence in criminal cases if necessary.81 Because there is no
similar EDR legislation in the other thirty-six states, there is no guarantee
that accident investigators won’t download the data with or without the
owner’s consent.
In Kirsch v. State,82 the Texas Court of Appeals addressed an
exception in the Texas Transportation Code which allows information
contained on a black box to be retrieved by someone other than the owner if
the owner consents.83 Brian Thomas Kirsch, a deputy sheriff, was convicted
78. See 84 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 15 (2005) (discussing EDR admissibility in
civil trials).
79. See Memorandum from Raymond P. Owings, Assoc. Admin. for Research and
Development, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Administration to The Docket (Sept. 30, 2011)
(on file with author) (noting NHTSA’s position about who owns EDR data and assuring that
the owner’s personal identifiable information is held to be confidential pursuant to the
Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 522a).
80. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-112-107 (2013); CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951 (2014); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-6-402 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-164aa (Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 1972-1973 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484D.485 (LEXIS 2013);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-G:1 (LEXIS 2014); N.Y. VEH. § TRAF. LAW § 416-b (Consol.
Supp. 2014); N.D. Cent. Code § 51-07-28 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.928, .932, .935,
.942, .945 (2014); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.615 (West 2013); UT CODE §§ 41-1a1501-04 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (West Supp. 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 46.35.020, 0.30 (Supp. 2014).
81. See 84 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 15 (2005) (noting that despite laws regarding
EDR ownership, data is easily admissible in court); see infra Part III.E discussing EDR
evidence in court.
82. Kirsch v. State, 276 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ), aff’d, 306 S.W.3d 738
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
83. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.615 (West 2013) (emphasis added). Consent may
also be obtained from anyone with authority over the property. See United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (“[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless
search by proof of voluntary consent, it . . . may show that permission to search was
obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient
relationship . . . .”). The State has the burden of establishing common authority, see Welch
v. State, 93 S.W.3d, 50, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Sep. 18, 2002), but in Kirsch the true
owner was present and gave authority.
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for driving while intoxicated, after crashing into a tractor trailer when he
was driving a borrowed patrol car.84 After the accident, the unconscious
Kirsch was transferred to a hospital for a blood-alcohol test which revealed
a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 approximately 80 minutes after the accident
occurred.85 In the meantime, investigators attempted to retrieve data from
the vehicle’s black box. The black box data showed that Kirsch delayed
applying his brake until less than one second before impact.86
Kirsch appealed his jury conviction for driving while intoxicated,
challenging the admission of the evidence obtained from the black box and
asserting that the evidence was seized in violation of his Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.87 Even
though Kirsch was driving the vehicle, he was not the registered owner.88
The true owner of the vehicle, however, consented to the removal of the
black box,89 rendering the search valid under the Fourth Amendment and
United States v. Matlock.90
3. Privacy
In addition to notice, ownership, and consent, individuals’ privacy
rights with regard to various uses for the data is a common concern. No
comprehensive federal privacy laws govern the collection, use, and sale of
personal information by private-sector companies.91 While members of
84. See Kirsch v. State, 276 S.W.3d at 581–82, 591 (explaining that Kirsch was
working an extra job on patrol in a borrowed patrol car).
85. Id. at 583–84 (finding that Kirsch’s blood-alcohol results were probative evidence
that he had consumed alcohol on the night of the accident).
86. Id. at 582–83 (explaining that the black box stored data concerning the vehicle’s
actions for five seconds prior to air bag deployment).
87. See id at 587–88 (asserting that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
black box data).
88. See Kirsch v. State, 276 S.W.3d 579, 588–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ), aff’d, 306
S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
89. Id. at 582 (explaining that the owner retrieved his personal items from the vehicle
and told the officers who were attempting to download the black box data to “do what you
need to do” to complete the investigation).
90. See id. at 588 (stating that the evidence shows the removal of the black box from
the true owner’s vehicle constituted a valid search); see also United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 171 (1974); see also Welch v. State, 93 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(holding that a recognized exception to searches conducted without a warrant includes when
voluntary consent to search has been given).
91. See GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 7 (furthering that, rather, the privacy of
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Congress have proposed legislation aimed at protecting the privacy of
location data by mobile devices and navigation systems, none of the
proposals have been enacted.92
Congress’s concerns have to do with both black boxes and GPS-type
devices.93 While serving different purposes, both have the capacity to
provide third parties with data that can be used to personally identify
drivers, their private information, and their driving habits.94 Data collected
from these devices can be sold to third parties for marketing or monitoring
and, disturbingly, it also has the potential to be used for stealing
individuals’ identity or stalking them.95 NHTSA believes that privacy
concerns are mitigated because it uses only a brief snapshot of EDR data
surrounding a crash.96 NHTSA also limits the amount of time after a crash
that EDR data can be retrieved to 10 days, and limits storage of the
information to 30 days.97 But as evidenced by the fairly minimal federal
regulations in place, while NHTSA has its own opinion on the matter, it
does not control the market or what auto manufacturers choose to do with
the EDRs placed in their vehicles.
A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report examining
ten companies involved in the automobile industry, including
manufacturers: Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, and
Nissan; GPS producers: Garmin and TomTom; and navigation developers:
Google Maps and Tele-nav, found a wide variety of policies regarding

consumers’ data is addressed in various federal laws).
92. See, e.g., Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 1312, 113th Cong.
(2013); Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 639, 113th Cong. (2013).
Additionally, a bill was introduced in the 112th Congress that addressed the privacy of
location data. See Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012, S. 1223, 112th Cong. (2011).
93. See GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 1–22 (including a letter responding to Sen. AlFranken’s request to review issues related to the privacy of location data collected by in-car
location-based services, including GPS).
94. See Swarts, supra note 5.
95. See GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 1–3 (expressing common concerns of privacy
groups and policy makers).
96. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., EVENT DATA RECORDERS, FINAL
RULE, at 39, 115 (Aug. 2006) (stating that NHTSA’s use of the data collected would not
raise privacy concerns and that a broader use of EDR data would not be necessary for
NHTSA’s purposes).
97. Id. (modifying the prior rule based upon information from manufacturers about
how much time it takes to complete crash test data analysis and validation).
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tracking drivers’ data.98 The report did not identify specific policies
employed by the investigated companies.99
The GAO report noted that recommended practices state that
“companies should safeguard location data, in part, by de-identifying them;
that companies should not keep location data longer than needed; and that
such data should be deleted after a specific amount of time.”100 “Deidentified” location data is data that has had personally identifiable
information, such as a consumer’s name or home address, removed or
masked.101 The report concluded that while the companies studied did
safeguard location data, they used a variety of de-identification methods
with no consistent levels of protection for consumers.102 The fact that deidentified data can be reconstituted in certain circumstances and reidentified was not specifically addressed by the companies.103
While the report noted that the ten companies had each taken some
steps consistent with the industry-recommended privacy practices, not all
practices were followed and, in certain instances, companies’ privacy
practices were “unclear, which could make it difficult for consumers to
understand the privacy risks that may exist.”104 For instance, companies
used a variety of methods to disclose their privacy practices to consumers
and the information about the use and sharing of location data was
sometimes unclear.105
C. State Laws on EDRs
Some states have attempted to address consumers’ EDR concerns but
because vehicles commonly travel across state lines, federal regulations are
better equipped to address the various issues.
California, in 2004, was the first state to enact legislation concerning
EDRs.106 Since then, thirteen additional states have followed suit.107 The
98. See GAO REPORT, supra note 41.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 10 n.13.
102. See id. at 16.
103. See id. at 10 n.13 (explaining that when “data are de-identified,” a consumer’s
personally identifiable information could be reconstituted in certain circumstances).
104. GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 2.
105. See id. at 12.
106. Nancy M. Erfle, Learning to Live with Electronic Data Recorders, 38 THE BRIEF
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crux in all fourteen states surrounds ownership—whether the owner of the
vehicle also owns the EDR and whether a lessee of a vehicle also leases or
owns the EDR during the lease period.108
While the individual state provisions vary considerably, all fourteen
states prohibit data downloading without the owner’s consent, with various
exceptions.109 The exceptions include data that has been subpoenaed by a
court order, data used for emergency medical care or for vehicle safety
research, and where there is probable cause of an offense.110 In other words,
states that specify the exception that the data may be used for vehicle safety
research without the owner’s consent are allowing government, NHTSA, or
auto manufacturers to download the data for safety research purposes.
Another critical distinction between states is notice and disclosure;
states have various levels of disclosure concerning the presence of data
recording technology. In Arkansas, a written notice at the time of vehicle
purchase from the dealership is required.111 By contrast, Connecticut does
not require any disclosure except “in agreements with subscription
services.”112 Subscription services might include insurance companies’
driving programs, such as Progressive’s Snapshot, which not every
consumer opts in to.113 Without thoroughly addressing the notice/disclosure
issue, Connecticut ignores the fact that many of consumers’ privacy
concerns might be mitigated were they at least aware of the fact that their
driving habits might be recorded.
While Arkansas appears to account for the notice concern, the state’s
regulations neglect the fact that not every driver purchases a new vehicle
14, 16 (2008).
107. See Privacy of Data from Event Data Recorders: State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (June 23, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunicationsand-information-technology/privacy-of-data-from-event-data-recorders.aspx (listing selected
provisions in the fourteen states with laws on sensing diagnostic modules).
108. Id.
109. Id. (demonstrating the degree of differences among states); See Lou Stanley,
Decoding Data: EDRs in Auto Claims Investigations, CLAIMS MAG., Mar. 2014, at 34,
(noting that ownership of the EDR and its data is a matter of state law and such provisions
vary considerably).
110. See Privacy of Data from Event Data Recorders: State Statutes, supra note 107
(listing exceptions where data can be downloaded without the owner’s consent).
111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-112-107 (2014). Note that the statute specifies purchase
from dealerships but many consumers purchase vehicles from other venues or third parties.
112. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-164aa (Supp. 2014).
113. See supra Part II.B, for a brief discussion of insurance companies’ use of tracking
devices.
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from a dealership. In Arkansas, if someone purchases a used vehicle other
than from a dealership, there may be no disclosure.
The states that have passed laws regarding EDR data collection have
made a progressive step in the right direction, but the laws are lacking in
depth and, in general, state laws regarding EDRs disregard an important
fact about cars: they cross state lines. When a driver leaves a state with
EDR legislation and travels to a state without it, the driver’s data may no
longer be protected. This is why a comprehensive federal law is necessary
to cover all vehicles’ EDRs and their owners or lessees.
D. The Fourth Amendment and Automobiles
Regardless of whether drivers have consented to—or are even aware
of—the presence of recording devices, do individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their vehicles from the ominous, ostensibly
objective witness within?
The question remains whether the government, NHTSA, automobile
manufacturers, or private companies may collect data from Americans’
vehicles and use it for their respective purposes. Significant government
regulation exists for automobiles operating on public roads, but regulation
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with regard to protections inside of a
vehicle is far from clear.114
1. Governmental Activity
The Fourth Amendment provides safeguards for the public to be
secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”115 The threshold question to consider is whether
there is governmental activity. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to
searches and seizures by private parties, reasonable or otherwise, if the
party is not acting as an agent of the government or with the participation or
knowledge of any governmental official.116
114. See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 474–75 (1991) (“Current search and seizure
doctrine is inconsistent and incoherent. No one, including the police who are to abide by it,
judges who apply it, or the people who are protected by it, has any meaningful sense of what
the law is.”).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
116. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Fourth Amendment Protections, and
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NHTSA, a government agency, does not currently require black boxes
in automobiles—although they would like to.117 Private parties (automobile
manufacturers) already install black boxes on their own initiative.118
NHTSA, supposedly, only uses the data from a crash for its research after
consent from vehicle owners.119 It might be difficult to assert that NHTSA’s
current involvement with this data constitutes a sufficient government
connection.
An alternative point of view might consider automobile manufacturers
as agents of the government by participating in the data collection NHTSA
uses. General Motors Company’s U.S. Consumer Privacy Statement
explains that GM receives information “from your vehicle’s Event Data
Recorder [] as described in your owner’s manual (i.e., how various systems
in your vehicle operate).”120 The privacy statement further notes instances
in which “GM may share the information it collects about you and your
vehicle . . .” including “with third parties for research and development
purposes (such as university research institutes for improving highway
safety).”121 A careful reading of GM’s entire privacy statement makes clear
that GM has a broad range of options regarding individuals’ personally
identifying information and vehicle data, including providing it to the
government—provided it is “for improving highway safety.”122
If NHTSA’s proposed legislation to mandate black boxes in all new
vehicles passes, there would be a stronger argument for government
activity. The Fourth Amendment analysis does not end there, however.
Equivalent State Constitutional Protections, as Applied to the Use of GPS Technology,
Transponder, or the Like, to Monitor Location and Movement of Motor Vehicle, Aircraft, or
Watercraft, 5 A.L.R. FED. 385 (2005).
117. See infra Part IV.1 (providing NHTSA’s proposal to mandate EDRs in all new
vehicles); see also Request for Comment on Automotive Electronic Control Systems Safety
and Security Notice, 79 Fed. Reg. 60574 n. 26 (noting that no final rule publication date has
been established).
118. See supra Part II (explaining that as vehicles became gradually more dependent on
computers to run internal systems, manufacturers increasingly installed EDRs into their
vehicles to perform a variety of operating and safety functions).
119. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,143 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (stating that the
agency strives to minimize impacts on privacy and obtains a vehicle owner’s consent prior to
obtaining EDR data in a crash investigation).
120. See Privacy Statement, GEN. MOTORS (last modified Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.gm.com/privacy/ (describing, minimally, the information General Motors
collects from its vehicles equipped with EDRs).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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2. Is Data Collection a Search?
If there is government activity, the collection of individuals’ data
without consent may be considered a Fourth Amendment search. NHTSA
and vehicle manufacturers claim they are not actually monitoring vehicles;
EDRs simply record information about crash situations.123 But the
collection of this data, even if its purpose is solely to improve vehicle
safety, may still be considered a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court asserts that the Fourth Amendment protection
from unreasonable government intrusion does not constitute a constitutional
“right to privacy”124 but depends on the expectation of privacy in the place
searched and whether that expectation is recognized by society as
reasonable.125 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally been
governed by the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test introduced by
Justice Harlan in his famous concurring opinion in United States v. Katz.126
Specifically, Justice Harlan held that a “search” requires two conditions to
be met: “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”127
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard depends, in large part,
“upon whether that expectation relates to information that has been exposed

123. See supra Part II.A (explaining the functions of EDRs).
124. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment cannot be generalized as a constitutional right to privacy and that the
protections of the Fourth Amendment often have nothing to do with privacy issues).
125. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (summarizing his reading of the majority’s
holding that “a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy”
and the reasonableness is measured by that which society is prepared to recognize as
“reasonable”) (emphasis added).
126. See id.; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311, 316 (2012) (asserting that from the 1960s until Jones, the search inquiry
was governed by the reasonable expectation of privacy test). In United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012), the court held that the Government’s attachment of a GPS device to
Jones’s vehicle to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a Fourth Amendment
“search.” Additionally, the court noted that the defendant possessed the vehicle at the time
the Government trespassorily inserted the information-gathering device and therefore the
Government physically occupied private property under the common law trespass test. Such
a physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.
127. See Katz 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining his understanding of
the rule from prior decisions and continuing to explain that “a man’s home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy”).
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to the public.”128 Accordingly, no invasion of privacy occurs if the invasion
or intrusion is something that the general public would be free to view.129
This makes the privacy issue with regard to vehicles a little vague.
The Fourth Amendment covers an individual’s privacy within their
vehicle but does not extend to the vehicle itself when driving on a public
road.130 By traveling on public roads, drivers cannot expect privacy with
regard to information they are voluntarily conveying to anyone within view,
such as the route they are traveling, the approximate speed of the car, and
the nature of their driving.131 These are all movements that any witness to a
car accident might be able to testify to.
This is the theory behind police using GPS tracking devices on
vehicles—GPS devices record only information that could be picked up by
the naked eye.132 While there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
outside of a vehicle, monitoring driver activity within a vehicle that is not
visible to the public is arguably different.133 The inside of a vehicle is
subject to Fourth Amendment protection.134
Accident reconstruction experts are able to hypothesize about the
speed of a car and braking times based on skid marks and other physical
128. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The D.C. Circuit posits that a single journey or trip is
not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy because roadways are public and open to
plain view but “the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not actually
exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is
effectively nil.” Id.
129. See United States v. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding that
in order for an invasion of privacy to occur, in a vehicle or otherwise, that “invasion or
intrusion must be of something which the general public would not be free to view”).
130. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person travelling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”). This theory derives from the open fields doctrine.
See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (stating that the distinction between an
open field and one’s home is “as old as the common law”).
131. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82 (furthering that by traveling on public streets, the
party “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling
over particular roads in a particular direction, . . . whatever stops he made, and . . . his final
destination when he exited from public roads onto private property”).
132. See Shields, supra note 116 (noting that electronic tracking devices have been
recognized to be governed by the law of search and seizure, and not by the laws of electronic
surveillance); GPS Overview, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/ (last visited Nov.
1, 2013) (noting that GPS provides users with positioning, navigation, and timing services).
133. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–14 (1986) (noting that the interior of
the vehicle, in contrast to the exterior, is subject to Fourth Amendment protection).
134. Id.
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evidence at the scene or on the vehicle.135 Bystanders, including law
enforcement officers, might witness an accident, speeding, driving under
the influence, driving without a seatbelt; but only the EDR may know
exactly what happened inside the vehicle—e.g. the exact moment that the
driver hit the brake or the precise rate of deceleration.136
While it has been held to be reasonable for an officer’s head or torso to
be inside an open car window during a stop, no law enforcement officer
would even be capable of performing a “search” of EDR data within a
vehicle simply by viewing it.137 If the EDR simply recorded information
which the public could view or even record with their personal phones and
video recorders, perhaps the black box is not protected. But it seems clear
that manufacturers are sharing with third parties personal driver information
that cannot be publicly surmised, constituting an invasion of privacy.138 If
no one is around to witness an accident, there is still a silent witness in our
car.
At the other end of the spectrum, drivers may find EDR data can be
used to their advantage in automobile product liability cases.139 The EDR
becomes a reliable “witness” for proving there was a mechanical problem
inside the vehicle,140 proving that a seatbelt was worn but injuries still
resulted, or proving that the driver depressed the brake pedal but nothing
happened.141
135. See generally AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CRASH
RECONSTRUCTION
BASICS
FOR
PROSECUTORS
11
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/crash_reconstruction_basics.pdf (describing the elements of
common crashes and the formula for determining speed from friction marks made by tires).
136. See Torchinsky, supra note 25 (providing examples of the capabilities of event
data recorders, including brake depression and rate of deceleration).
137. See United States v. Ryles, 988 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that a state
trooper would not have been unreasonable either in placing his head inside the interior of the
vehicle through an open window or in opening the driver’s door and placing his torso inside,
even assuming he did not smell marijuana before the intrusion).
138. See Swarts, supra note 16.
139. See infra III.E.1, for a discussion of Bachman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d
262, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), in which the plaintiff won based on evidence from an EDR
that her airbag had inadvertently deployed, causing the accident.
140. See id. Individuals may have little bargaining power when it comes to lawsuits
against automobile manufacturers. But if a mechanical problem caused the accident, this
could be to the consumer’s advantage.
141. Recall the Toyota unintended acceleration crisis in 2011. See Csaba Csere, It’s All
Your Fault: The DOT Renders Its Verdict on Toyota’s Unintended-Acceleration Scare, CAR
AND DRIVER (June 2011), http://www.caranddriver.com/features/its-all-your-fault-the-dotrenders-its-verdict-on-toyotas-unintended-acceleration-scare-feature (reporting that an
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3. Is Data Collection a Seizure?

The next inquiry: whether data collection constitutes a seizure. Even if
one considers data collection to be a Fourth Amendment search, private
companies may still be able to collect and use the data, particularly if
companies argue that vehicle owners provided consent, or even implied
consent, by purchasing the vehicle already equipped with EDR
technology.142
A seizure of property, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, occurs
when “there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s
possessory interests in that property.”143 The owner of property has a right
to exclude it from “all the world,” and government use “infringes that
exclusionary right.”144 Additionally, seizures of property must be based on
probable cause or reasonable, articulable suspicion.145
EDRs are a functional component of an automobile, rather than a
distinct piece of personal property.146 Thus, even if the owner of the vehicle
is considered to own the EDR, a seizure of the EDR’s data does not actually
deprive the owner of any possessory interest in the EDR.147 One might
complain that the time it took for a law enforcement officer to download the
EDR data after an accident was a meaningful interference with their
possessory interest and infringed on their exclusionary right to it. However,

examination of the problem Toyota vehicles’ EDRs demonstrated that none of them showed
pre-impact braking or substantial acceleration, suggesting that drivers were unaware of
impending crashes).
142. See Privacy Statement, supra note 120 (describing instances where GM shares
information it collects about drivers and their vehicles with third parties).
143. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
144. Id. at 729 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700 (1983); see also Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 749 (1983) (Stevens, J., with Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); see also
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). When there is probable cause to believe
that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, the Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment permits law enforcement officers to seize the property pending issuance of a
warrant if justified by exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant
requirement. See Place, 462 U.S. at 701.
146. See Glennon, supra note 19 (explaining the interconnectivity of EDRs in vehicles).
147. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (describing a seizure of property as occurring when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that
property).
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if there is a court order to download the data, probable cause has already
been established and seizure would be warranted.148
Law enforcement may also be able to seize EDR data under the theory
of exigent circumstances.149 Any data not downloaded soon after an
accident could be destroyed; there might be another crash that results in a
fire and destroys the EDR or the driver might even attempt to tamper with
the device to avoid potential liability.150 When such exigent circumstances
exist, particularly with regard to vehicles in which the owner already has a
diminished expectation of privacy, seizure of potential evidence has been
found to be constitutional.151
E. EDR Data as Evidence in Civil and Criminal Trials
EDRs were not designed to provide evidence for criminal
prosecutions, but evidence obtained from EDRs has been increasingly used
in certain types of criminal trials such as motor vehicle homicide, operating
under the influence, and driving to endanger.152 Police and investigators use
the data to reconstruct what happened in a crash to help apportion blame.153
In civil cases, “[c]ourts . . . have manifested a willingness to accept data
collected by these [EDR] systems . . . as long as it complies with the
applicable evidentiary standard of ‘general acceptance’ as a legitimate
technology.”154
148. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment allows for search warrants
only if there is a finding of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Id.
149. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding a warrantless
search of an automobile is constitutional based upon exigency); see also People v.
Christmann, 776 N.Y.S.2d 437, 441 (2004) (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974)) (noting that the Carroll exigency exception now has been mostly replaced by
findings that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles).
150. See Black Box Data, DYSART LAW FIRM, http://www.dysart-law.com/cases-weaccept/winning-your-case/the-importance-of-preserving-evidence/black-box-data/ (pointing
out that insurance companies and defendants “can be expected to work hard to avoid
liability”).
151. See People v. Christmann, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 441 (explaining the concept of
exigency with regard to warrantless searches of automobiles).
152. See Glancy, supra note 53, at 14; see also Shields, supra note 23, at 595 (giving
examples of the routine uses of black box data in prosecutions).
153. See Travers, supra note 22 (explaining common uses of EDR data).
154. Frank Douma & Jordan Deckenbach, The Challenge of ITS for the Law of Privacy,
2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 295, 314 (2009).
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Recall that Kirsch argued that his delayed brake timing did not
indicate impairment because the tractor-trailer that he crashed into made an
unexpected right-hand turn.155 Viewed in a light most favorable to the jury’s
verdict, the appellate court found that the brake timing evidence from the
black box data supported the inference that the delayed response was
caused by alcohol.156 Finding the evidence legally sufficient to support the
verdict, the appellate court did not even reach the alternative means by
which the State could prove intoxication—based on proof that Kirsch’s
blood alcohol concentration was above 0.08.157
This may seem like an unsupported inference, but it illustrates a
privacy concern implicated by the collection of EDR data. For instance, a
law enforcement officer who pulls over a car for speeding may have
probable cause to conduct a field sobriety test, or even a Breathalyzer test,
to determine whether the driver was intoxicated beyond the legal limit.158
The driver may then be transported to a hospital where blood work will also
conclusively show the driver’s level of intoxication.159 But Brian Kirsch
was convicted based on third-party data and an expert witness testifying
about reaction times.160 Of course, in this case his blood-alcohol level was
over the legal limit anyway.161 That does not diminish the fact that the data
from the black box assumed the role of the police and became an objective
witness to the accident.162 Kirsch may not have even known that was a
possibility.
In Kirsch, there appeared to be sufficient extrinsic and technical
evidence to support the finding that the driver was liable for the accident.163
155. See Kirsch v. State, 276 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (summarizing
appellant’s argument for the legal sufficiency analysis of evidence of driving while
intoxicated).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See State v. Marks, 644 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (finding that field
sobriety tests did not violate motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights when a valid speeding
stop was made and motorist exhibited visual signs of intoxication, thus giving the officer
probable cause to arrest).
159. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771–72 (1966) (finding that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect an individual against actions by private individuals, thus a
seizure of a blood sample by a hospital for treatment purposes is not within the ambit of the
Fourth Amendment).
160. See Kirsch, 276 S.W.3d at 748.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 740.
163. See id.

PUTTING THE BRAKES ON DRIVER PRIVACY

185

But in cases where courts must rely almost entirely on technical evidence
and data, the potential for technical error, misuse, and incorrect convictions
or incorrect exonerations looms.164 Due to the technology involved, EDR
data may not always be reliable and/or accurate enough to be used in court
and the reliability “likely will continue to be—fodder for Daubert
challenges.”165
Prosecutors of motor vehicle offenses attempting to use EDR data
must overcome two critical evidentiary issues; the data must be admissible
under the relevant standard for testimony by expert crash reconstructionists
(almost all jurisdictions apply either the federal Daubert166 test or the older
test under Frye)167 and the prosecutor must show the probative value of the
data in establishing the driver’s conduct.168 “In civil cases, the latter hurdle
has proven the more difficult to overcome, but the passage of time and an
accompanying rise in use of automotive black boxes may bring greater
judicial endorsement of the data’s probative value.”169
1. Admissibility of Evidence
Admissibility of EDR data might be essential in ensuring the
achievement of justice in accident investigations. Courts have been
inconsistent regarding the admissibility of EDR data.170 In one of the
164. See John G. Browning, Emerging Technology and its Impact on Automotive
Litigation, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 83, 88 (Jan. 2014) (introducing a brief summary of courts
struggling with admissibility of this new technology).
165. See id. After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to reflect the decision. Daubert set forth a nonexclusive checklist for trial courts to use in assessing the reliability of scientific expert
testimony: (1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested; (2)
whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence
and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been
generally accepted in the scientific community. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
166. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (explaining the Daubert test).
167. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The “general
acceptance” test of Frye was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
168. See Shields, supra note 23, at 595 (adding that this prong is necessary for the data
to be of any practical use).
169. Kevin J. Powers, David Hasselhoff No Longer Owns the Only Talking Car:
Automotive Black Boxes in Criminal Law, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2005).
170. See Browning, supra note 164 (explaining that courts have gone both ways in
determining the admissibility of EDR data).
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earliest decisions involving EDR data in 2000, the Sixth Circuit reversed a
summary judgment for General Motors in a products liability case, holding
that the General Motors expert’s affidavit relying on the EDR data was
insufficient in and of itself to justify rejecting the plaintiff’s claims outright
that the air bag deployed after the accident.171 Conversely, in another
leading case, Bachman v. General Motors Corp., application of the Frye
test supported admissibility of EDR data.172 Debra Bachman brought an
action against her automobile manufacturer and others for injuries she and
her daughter suffered, claiming her air bag sensing and diagnostic module
(SDM) was “hypersensitive” to road surfaces and inadvertently deployed,
causing the accident.173 Over the plaintiff’s objections, the trial court
admitted the EDR data as well as the General Motors expert’s interpretation
of that data.174 An expert for the defendants testified that the downloaded
data “showed that the delta-v for [Bachman’s] Cavalier during the collision
was 16.2 miles per hour, which was above the air-bag deployment threshold
of 14 miles per hour.”175
Affirming the jury’s verdict against the plaintiff, the Illinois Appellate
Court stated that, “the process of recording and downloading SDM data
does not appear to constitute a novel technique or method,” thus satisfying
the Frye admissibility standard, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the use of this kind of data had “gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community.”176 Application of the Frye
test in Bachman supports the admissibility of EDR data.177 The Frye
standard, also known as the general acceptance test, dictates that scientific
evidence can only be admitted at trial if the methodology or scientific
principle upon which the opinion is based is “sufficiently established to
171.
See Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 802–04 (6th Cir. 2000)
(summarizing General Motors’ argument that the air bag could not have deployed
“belatedly” in the manner described by the plaintiff because the data suggested that the
system functioned as designed by deploying during plaintiff’s accident). Harris, the Plaintiff,
claimed that after the accident, as she reached to turn off the ignition, the air bag deployed
and broke her arm. Id.
172. See Bachman v. General Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d 262, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(holding SDM data admissible under the Frye test).
173. See id. at 271 (explaining that the SDM is an air bag crash sensor).
174. See id.
175. Id. at 279–80 (adding that if, as plaintiffs alleged, the air bag inadvertently
deployed prior to the collision, “‘there would be two records present in the SDM’: (1) the
inadvertent deployment; and (2) the 16.2 mile per hour delta-v”).
176. Id. at 281–83.
177. Id.
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have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.”178
2. Discovery
Discovery can be an issue simply because of the varying technologies
and state rules surrounding the retrieval of EDR data, but generally, there
must be either consent or a court order to retrieve such data.179 Many
professional accident investigators have devices which allow a laptop to
communicate with an EDR to download the information, but there remain
many vehicles whose data can only be retrieved by the manufacturer.180
Additional issues of spoliation of evidence are likely to plague courts
confronted with EDR evidence.181 Steps must be taken to preserve crash
data since there have been cases involving post-accident events that
triggered the loss of data.182 These cases indicate the need for a more
comprehensive bright-line rule that law enforcement officers download
EDR data whenever possible at the scene of an accident.
IV. The Future of EDRs
EDRs are here to stay and if NHTSA has its way, at some point all
vehicles on the road will have recording capabilities.183 This technology is
constantly advancing and becoming more prevalent in vehicles.184
178. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
179. The following are state laws governing retrieval of EDR data: ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-112-107 (2013); CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-402 (2014);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-164aa (Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 1972-1973
(2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484D.485 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357G:1 (LexisNexis 2014); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 416-b (Consol. Supp. 2014); N.D. Cent.
Code § 51-07-28 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.928, .932, .935, .942, .945 (2014); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.615 (West 2013); UT CODE §§ 41-1a-1501-04 (2014); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (West Supp. 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 46.35.020, 0.30
(Supp. 2014).
180. See Leonard Bucklin, There’s a Black Box in Your Client’s Car – EDR, LAWYER
TRIAL FORMS 1, 4–5, available at http://lawyertrialforms.com/catalog/power-articles/MVAEDR-article.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2014) (describing recoverability and usability of EDR
data).
181. See Browning, supra note 164 (discussing issues of spoliation of evidence).
182. See id.
183. See Editorial, Black Boxes Are in 96% of New Cars, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2013,
6:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/01/06/black-boxes-cars-edr/1566098/
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A. Proposed Legislation

The following proposals reflect an attempt to create consistent
standards regarding EDR data and to address various ownership and notice
concerns.
1. NHTSA’s Proposal
Currently, the federal government does not require manufacturers to
install EDRs, but in December, 2012, NHTSA formally proposed
regulations to establish a new safety standard mandating the installation of
EDRs in all light vehicles that are required to have frontal air bags
(essentially all light vehicles).185 The purpose of this proposed regulation is
to “expand and, therefore, potentially enhance the utilization of the
recorded information and lead to further improvements in the safety of
current and future motor vehicles.”186 The EDRs would still need to meet
the standards of the existing 2006 regulations.187
NHTSA believes that the information available, if all new vehicles
were equipped with EDR functions, would be “vital to an agency
(concluding that black boxes are not going anywhere).
184. See GAO REPORT, supra note 41 (writing that the prevalence of these systems has
brought consumers significant benefits and features as well as raised privacy concerns).
185. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,144 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). The EDRs in those
vehicles would be required by the new standard to meet the data elements, data capture and
format, data retrieval, and data crash survivability requirements contained in 49 C.F.R. pt.
563. See also Memorandum from William Shakely, Attorney Advisor, Nat’l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin. to Docket No. NHTSA-2012-0177 (Aug. 27, 2013), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NHTSA-2012-0177-1038 (setting forth
substantive changes to the Dec. 13, 2012 NPRM after the review by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)). Walk-in van-type trucks or vehicles designed
to be sold exclusively to the United States Postal Service are excluded from air bag and EDR
requirements. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 74,144 .
186. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,152 (explaining that NHTSA believes requiring EDRs in all light vehicles could
potentially enhance the utilization of the recorded information and lead to further
improvements in the safety of current and future motor vehicles).
187. Id. at 74,146. The 2012 proposal would not modify any of the requirements or
specifications already existing for EDRs voluntarily installed between September 1, 2012
and September 1, 2014; See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the current regulations on
existing EDRs.
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investigation seeking to determine whether there is a safety defect in
vehicles that are being driven by consumers on the road and to agency
efforts to assess the performance of advanced safety technologies for
possible future regulatory action.”188
This proposal is two-fold; it may truly increase drivers’ safety but it
will also eliminate consumers’ individual rights to make choices about the
types of vehicles they drive—whether they want to drive a vehicle that has
the capacity to record their driving or not.
2. Black Box Privacy Protection Act
In response to NHTSA’s 2012 proposal, Representative Michael
Capuano (D-MA) introduced the Black Box Privacy Protection Act, H.R.
2414, which amends the Automobile Information Disclosure Act to require
automobile manufacturers to disclose the presence of EDRs on new
automobiles and to require manufacturers to provide the consumer with the
option to enable or disable such devices on future automobiles.189 Capuano
believes that “[c]onsumers should have control over the information
collected by event data recorders in vehicles that they own and they should
have the option of disabling the device if they choose to do so. This is a
basic issue of privacy.”190
The bill requires the following information on the window of the
automobile: (1) the presence and location191 of an event data recorder,
(2) the type of information recorded and how such information is recorded,
and (3) that the recording may be used in a law enforcement proceeding.192
188. Id. at 74,150.
189. See Black Box Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 2414, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013). This
bill was assigned to a congressional committee on June 18, 2013 which will consider it
before possibly sending it on to the House or Senate as a whole. Rep. Capuano has been
filing this bill since 2006. See Mike Capuano, Congressman Capuano’s E-Update, Privacy,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPS. (July 19, 2013), available at http://capuano.house.gov/eupdates/eu2013-07-19.shtml (explaining H.R. 2414 as giving consumers control over EDR
data).
190. Press Release, Rep. Michael E. Capuano, Congressman Capuano Introduces
Legislation Giving Consumers More Control Over Their Car’s “Black Boxes” (June 29,
2011), available at http://www.house.gov/capuano/news/2011/pr062911.shtml. This bill is
co-sponsored by Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI).
191. The wording of this bill demonstrates the lack of understanding about EDR
systems since it is not a box sitting in one location of the vehicle but instead a complex,
interconnected system.
192. See H.R. 2414, § 3.
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Additionally, it requires the EDR, and any data recorded, to be considered
the property of the owner of the automobile or motorcycle.193
If this bill passes, it would seem to eliminate almost all notice issues as
well as some privacy concerns.
3. Driver Privacy Act
Another recent bill, introduced January 14, 2014 by Senator Amy
Klobucher, (D-MN) and Senator John Hoeven, (R-ND), covers the same
ownership issue as the Black Box Privacy Protection Act194 and adds a
measure for protecting driver privacy.195 The Act provides that EDR data
cannot be extracted from individual’s cars or taken by another party without
the owner’s consent except under specific circumstances: under
authorization by a court of law, when the data is necessary in an emergency
medical situation, or for the purpose of traffic safety research.196 In other
words, NHTSA may retrieve information from drivers’ vehicles without
owners’ consent in some circumstances. The data retrieved for traffic safety
research, however, must not disclose any personally identifiable
information about the owner or lessee of the vehicle, including the vehicle
identification number.197
The Act covers another issue—the lessee of a leased vehicle is also
considered the owner during the lease period for purposes of the EDR and
its data. 198 Many consumers choose to lease vehicles and deserve the same
ownership rights over the data produced by their driving of the leased
vehicle.
This bill would provide the initial safeguards necessary to ensure that
personally identifiable information remains undisclosed.199 Regardless of
the passage of the Black Box Privacy Protection Act or the Driver Privacy

193. See id. at § 5.
194. See Driver Privacy Act, S. 1925, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014). The Driver Privacy Act
makes any information in a vehicle’s EDR the property of the vehicle’s owner or lessee.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. Of the 14 states that have passed EDR legislation, only a few mention leasing of a
vehicle in addition to ownership. For a list of these states, see supra note 80.
199. See S. 1925, § 2.
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Act, EDRs are not going anywhere.200 Their presence and use will
inevitably become commonplace in our society.201
B. Potential Misuses of EDRs
The current proposals fail to sufficiently address the potential issues of
reliability and security.202 It is important to understand the potential misuses
of this data by criminals, courts, and terrorists. “As vehicles become more
integrated with wireless technology, there are more avenues through which
a hacker could introduce malicious code, and more avenues through which
a driver’s basic right to privacy could be compromised.”203
1. Reliability
As EDR technology continues to improve, the data retrieved is
considered to be accurate in many cases and reliable for its intended
purposes.204 But critics have questioned the data’s reliability.205
Reliability has multiple components: whether the system will work
under a variety of conditions, the accuracy of the information generally, and
finally, the integrity and encryption of the data which can be subject to
corruption.206 Black boxes in aircraft are specially engineered to withstand
extreme conditions—submersion in water, fire, and major crashes. This
engineering may not be as applicable to automobiles, but major road
accidents do happen and if the data is to be relied upon, it must be

200. See Trop, supra note 2 (stating that approximately 96 percent of new vehicles sold
in the United States have black boxes).
201. Id.
202. See Browning, supra note 164 (noting that the pending universality of EDR use
contributes to the ongoing challenges of reliability).
203. Jim Finkle, U.S. Senator Seeks Information on Carmaker Efforts to Thwart
Hackers, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/us-hacking-carsmarkeyidUKBRE9B213620131203.
204. See Lawrence S. Nordoff, Accuracy of Various Measuring Tasks for
Reconstructionists—Accuracy of EDR Data, 2 LITIGATING MAJOR AUTOMOBILE INJURY AND
DEATH CASES § 30:38 (Oct. 2013).
205. See Trop, supra note 2.
206. See Aditi Mukherji, Black Boxes in Cars Raise Legal Concerns, FINDLAW (July
22, 2013, 9:54 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2013/07/black-boxes-in-carsraise-legal-concerns.html (discussing reliability concerns of black box car crash data).
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retrievable under a variety of circumstances. Additionally, anyone today
can purchase software to overwrite and erase EDR data.207
According to a NHTSA study, “[c]urrent EDR technology can provide
very useful information to crash reconstructionists and vehicle safety
researchers by objectively reporting real-world crash data . . . .”208 That
same study, however, notes that “[EDR data] should always be used in
conjunction with other data sources . . . .”209 And according to a Toyota
spokesman in 2010, Toyota’s devices are “experimental and unreliable for
reporting crash data.”210
It seems as though society should care about justice and ensuring that
negligent drivers are punished when their driving causes bodily harm. But
what about a situation in which an insurance company seeks to admit EDR
data because it tends to show that you, the owner and driver, were more at
fault even though you are sure that there was a defect in the car because the
brake pedal was not responding?
Inaccurate or incomplete EDR data can be detrimental to a plaintiff
trying to prove a vehicle defect or a vehicular manslaughter defendant
trying to prove innocence. This data has not been used in court enough to
establish clear and consistent use and there is still something chilling about
the presence of a silent witness in your car that can “testify” against you in
court.
2. Cyber Security Concerns
In 2011, researchers hacked into two vehicles as an experiment to
prove potential vulnerabilities.211 The researchers did not have direct
207. See Event Data Recorders: Problems with Ownership, Privacy, and Evidence,
NEWSOMEBLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.newsomeblog.com/2012/11/02/event-datarecorders-problems-with-ownership-privacy-and-evidence/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2014)
(discussing the issue of data integrity).
208. MARCO P. DASILVA, ANALYSIS OF EVENT DATA RECORDER DATA FOR VEHICLE
SAFETY IMPROVEMENT, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. 77 (Apr. 2008) available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/Research/Event+Data+Recorder+(EDR)/Event+Data+Recorder+(E
DR)+Research+Applications+of+Articles,+Products+and+Research. This study analyzed
2,541 EDR files downloaded from databases supplied by NHTSA to assess the accuracy and
usefulness of EDR data in crash reconstruction and improvement of vehicle safety systems.
209. Id. at 78.
210. Travers, supra note 22.
211. See Markoff, supra note 44.
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physical access to the cars but were able to gain remote access and override
vehicle controls by undermining the security of the cellular phone inside the
vehicle, which subsequently allowed them to send commands to the car’s
electronic control unit.212 Although an actual vehicle hacking has yet to be
reported, the researchers’ experiment demonstrates the capacity of a hacker
to remotely control vehicles containing EDRs, cellular connections, and
Bluetooth wireless technology.213
The auto industry claims to be making cybersecurity a top priority.214
Senator Ed Markey (D-MA), a member of the Commerce Committee that
oversees automobiles, said that “[t]hese threats demonstrate the need for
robust vehicle security policies to ensure the safety and privacy of our
nation’s drivers.”215 But the auto industry may not be the best equipped to
protect vehicle owners from hackers. Modern cars with expensive
infotainment systems are essentially rolling computers, but according to a
security expert, “the average auto maker is about 20 years behind software
companies in understanding how to prevent cyberattacks.”216 Until
standards for protection are addressed across the industry, car owners and
passengers remain vulnerable to attack.
If a hacker did gain access to a vehicle’s computer system, a consumer
might have a cause of action under consumer protection laws; a court would
need to find that the auto maker knew or should have known about its cars’
vulnerability to hacking and should have disclosed that vulnerability.217 A
car’s computer system may also be a “protected computer” under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)—the primary federal statute
aimed at combating computer crime.218 The CFAA defines a “computer” as
212. See id. (noting that the computer hackers did not require any more than a modest
amount of expertise to gain control).
213. Id.
214. See John K. Sutherland, Automakers Making Vehicle Cyber Security a Top
Priority,
THE
CHRONICLE
HERALD
(Jan.
10,
2014),
http://thechronicle
herald.ca/wheelsnews/1178810-automakers-making-vehicle-cyber-security-a-top-priority
(explaining that the auto industry is aware of the potential cybersecurity issues).
215. Press Release, Sen. Ed Markey, As Wireless Technology Becomes Standard,
Markey Queries Car Companies About Security, Privacy, (Dec. 2, 2013), available at
http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/as-wireless-technology-becomesstandard-markey-queries-car-companies-about-security-privacy.
216. Balough & Balough, supra note 21.
217. See id. (comparing a consumer’s potential cause of action in the above example to
a class action where plaintiffs alleged defendants reasonably should have known about a
faulty part in a car and should have disclosed the defect to consumers).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
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an “electronic . . . high speed data processing device . . .”219 In modern
vehicles, ECMs connect to one another, akin to computers on a network,
thus ECUs, EDRs, and other vehicle systems meet this definition of
“computer.”220 But in order to fall under the CFAA, these systems must be
“protected” computers.
The car or ECUs must be considered a computer “which is used in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”221 Computers probably fit
this definition if they are connected to the Internet which is inherently
interstate commerce.222 While cars do travel across state lines, is a car’s
system really affecting interstate commerce as defined by the CFAA?
Even if a car cannot be considered a protected computer, the path a
hacker uses to infect a car’s ECU with malware might involve a protected
computer. For instance, any time an owner takes a car to a dealership for
maintenance, the risk exists that a hacker has introduced malware into the
dealer’s computer which could then be transferred to the vehicle’s computer
system. The dealership’s computer connects to the Internet and would be a
protected computer under the CFAA. Similarly, insurance companies that
monitor drivers to reduce premiums, such as Progressive, use computers
that are subject to malware which could potentially be transferred to
vehicles in violation of the CFAA.223
It is unclear whether existing laws provide a viable way to address
malicious hacking into automotive computer systems, either as a civil cause
of action or criminal offense. Regardless of the CFAA’s application, car
dealerships and insurance companies must understand the extent to which
their systems can affect vehicles which consumers rely on to operate and
function normally.

219. Id. at § 1030(e)(1).
220. See Glennon, supra note 19 (positing that a vehicle’s internal network operates
much like any other computer network).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
222. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F3d 237, 245 (3d. Cir. Mar. 9, 2006) (holding
that the Internet is a channel and instrumentality of interstate commerce which Congress can
regulate because the Internet and interstate commerce are inexorably intertwined).
223. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of Progressive Auto Insurance driver
monitoring programs.

PUTTING THE BRAKES ON DRIVER PRIVACY

195

V. Conclusion
Eventually, most vehicles on the road will be equipped with some type
of black box or recording device.224 One would expect most consumers to
be in favor of black box technology because it contributes to safer vehicles
and regulations, provides options for lower insurance rates, and assists in
developing accurate evidence following an accident. A beneficial side
effect of the presence of black boxes in vehicles is that it could actually lead
to safer drivers not just safer vehicles. Studies have shown that the presence
of recording devices increases driver safety by helping to modify driver
behavior.225 This hinges on the basic fact that drivers must be aware of the
presence of black boxes in order to be influenced to drive more safely.
This is a key moment in which to anticipate issues surrounding the
juncture of consumer privacy and EDRs. The proposed Black Box Privacy
Protection Act provides the transparency necessary for consumers to
understand the presence of EDRs and their capabilities. But as the law
stands today, most consumers are oblivious to the fact that their driving
might be recorded. Consumers, at the very least, have a right to know that
information regarding their driving may be collected and their actions might
be recorded. Everyone wants to reap the benefits of data collection, but
when vast storehouses of data are unregulated and personal information is
at risk, consumers should be able to opt-in or opt-out.
Consumers appreciate options, transparency, and the knowledge that
their privacy is protected. The Fourth Amendment offers a minimum
protection of privacy, but the government can do more by legislatively
restricting governmental access to records, even if the black box itself is
constitutional. As more recording devices are installed in vehicles, and
particularly if they are soon mandated in all new vehicles, legislators must
take steps to ensure that the privacy rights and interests of citizens are
protected.

224. See Travers, supra note 22 (noting the NHTSA proposed rule requiring EDRs in
all light-passenger vehicles starting September 1, 2014).
225. See Travers, supra note 22 (citing NHTSA studies which show crash reductions of
as much as 30 percent in vehicles equipped with EDRs); see also Harry Stoffer, Promise and
Pitfalls Seen in Black Box, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Sept. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.autonews.com/article/20010917/SEO/109170720/promise-and-pitfalls-seen-in-blackbox (explaining a finding from a panel of industry experts that driver awareness of the
presence of black boxes “tends to reduce the number and severity of crashes”).

